On “I”

A “web of belief” presupposes a “believer,” an “I.” I think that this fact is often overlooked: without an “I,” there isn’t a web of belief (there isn’t any belief). The “I” is at its center. While it is a strength of the “web of belief” hypothesis that all views may be challenged, it isn’t clear how the belief in the existence of an “I” could ever be rationally justified, even in theory (unless of course the principle of rationality was abandoned, but those who hold such “webs” are determined to be without even a rhyme or reason to hold such a view; it’s not clear why we would give up a web of reasons for a lack thereof). Consequently, it is the “I” that should, and I think always does, take precedent over any and all other beliefs. Despite its omnipresence (wherever there is presence), what the “I” actually is, is a paradoxically elusive fact. Is it a soul? But this seems to require beliefs that extend (without clear deductive steps) far beyond the center of the web (this is a short and painfully incomplete rebuttal, but hopefully does enough to show room for doubt). Is it merely the composition of sensory information? But this also requires further beliefs, based on further evidence than merely the existence of the “I.” René Descartes famously defined the “I” as a “thinking thing.” He argued that since he thought, he is (“cognito, argo sum”), which means that he is, at least, a thing(s) that thinks. Under deep scrutiny (perhaps only undertaken by the most meticulous/boring philosophers) the argument seems to require some doctoring to arrive at what Descartes hoped it would. Ayn Rand, unfairly and out of context, chastised Descartes in getting it backwards: “I am, therefore I think.” For me, the lack of a blatant answer seems the most blatant answer: determining what the “I” is seems to be a lifelong process (probably longer, regardless of overtime). It is the subject of music, literature, and arguably all, expression. The question is empirical.

What is it to experience the “I” (to be conscious)? It often includes the experiences of thought, sight, taste, sound, smell, and touch. This however is not a clear description of what it means to be an “I.” In fact, it seems that such a description is impossible. A written and spoken description of “making love” will fail to completely express its sound to the deaf, its view to the blind, its smell to the smell-impaired, the taste to the taste-impaired, the feel to the touch-impaired, and the thoughts to the mindless [pardon the example, but it does significantly involve each sense]. Moreover, insofar as is relevant to my pursuit, the “I” involves beliefs and therefore, thought, and in practice, choice and action.